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Abstract 
Hedge funds rely on “prime brokerage” units within banks to provide leverage. With the 
enhanced capital requirements and new liquidity standards introduced by Basel III driving 
up the cost to banks of engaging in such financing, prime brokers have begun to offer an 
alternative means of providing hedge fund clients with leveraged exposure to securities. 
Known as synthetic financing, this alternative requires the prime broker to enter into 
derivatives contracts with the clients. Under the Basel III framework, the ability of banks to 
hedge and net such derivative positions results in capital and liquidity costs for synthetic 
financing that are lower than those for traditional securities financing. This case considers 
whether synthetic financing should be treated differently than traditional securities 
financing for capital and liquidity requirement purposes, as well as considering the risks 
associated with the shift toward synthetic financing. 
  
__________________________________________________________________ 
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1.  Introduction  
Even the most sophisticated hedge funds rely on banks to provide them with financial 
services central to the funds’ success, and banks seeking to meet the needs of their hedge 
fund clients face the challenge of developing service offerings that generate an acceptable 
rate of return for the bank given the regulatory framework. The banking divisions 
responsible for providing these offerings are known as “prime brokers,” and the services 
involved range from asset custody to trade execution to risk management. Given the nature 
of the services provided and the sophistication of the client base, the prime brokerage 
industry is dominated by a handful of leading financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley and J.P. Morgan.  
One of the main services that hedge funds want is the ability to use leverage to enhance the 
returns that they could generate using only their own capital. In its traditional form, prime 
brokers lend hedge funds cash or securities to use in transactions. For example, a hedge fund 
with $10 in hand that borrows $90 from a prime broker and purchases $100 in stock can 
secure exposure to $100 worth of stock with only $10 in capital. The prime broker, in turn, 
records a $90 asset on its balance sheet tied to the repayment of the loan; an asset that 
becomes subject to regulations concerning bank capital. 
With the enhanced capital requirements and new liquidity standards introduced by Basel III 
driving up the cost to banks of engaging in such traditional securities financing, prime 
brokers have begun to offer an alternative means of providing hedge fund clients with 
leveraged exposure to securities. Known as synthetic financing, this alternative requires the 
prime broker enter into derivatives contracts with the clients to replicate the desired 
exposure. Under the Basel III framework, the ability of banks to hedge and net such 
derivative positions results in capital and liquidity costs that are lower than those for 
traditional securities financing. Banks have passed along some of these savings in the form 
of preferential rates for synthetic financing relative to traditional securities financing. A 
desire to mitigate the impact of Basel III has thus driven a shift from traditional securities 
financing to synthetic financing. 
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
prime brokerage industry. Section 3 describes the traditional securities financing business 
of prime brokers and explains how the enhanced capital requirements and new liquidity 
standards introduced by the Basel III framework are increasing the cost to prime brokers of 
offering traditional securities financing. Section 4 outlines how synthetic financing works 
and how its treatment under Basel III resulted in a shift toward it by prime brokers. Section 
5 concludes with some discussion of the implications of this shift. 
Questions 
1. Should synthetic financing be treated differently than traditional securities financing 
for capital and liquidity requirement purposes? 
2. Are there risks associated with the shift toward synthetic financing by prime brokers? 
2. Prime Brokerage Industry 
Central to the success of any hedge fund is the ability to effectively access the global markets. 
As one industry commentator has put it, “[t]rading securities on the scale and with the 
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frequency of the most successful hedge funds takes more than a few Bloomberg screens and 
an online brokerage account” (Spangler 2013). Providing the “more” that is required here 
are prime brokers, units within banks that offer a range of financial services that support the 
operations of hedge fund clients. These services can include everything from maintaining 
custody of a hedge fund’s assets to executing its trades to helping it manage its risk. 
Given the nature of the services involved and the sophistication of the client base, the prime 
brokerage business has been long dominated by a handful of leading financial institutions. 
However, the prime brokerage industry has seen some changes in its structure in the wake 
of the financial crisis of 2007-09. Prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the resulting 
heightened concern about counterparty risk, hedge funds typically had only one prime 
broker. In 2009 however, hedge funds with at least $3 billion in assets had on average 4.8 
prime brokers. This diversification created an opening for smaller prime brokers to gain 
market share at the expense of some of the industry’s largest players. Yet the opening proved 
short-lived. Lower trading volumes and the potential reduction in counterparty risk fears 
with the passage of time have resulted in a decline in the average number of prime brokers 
used to 3.9 in 2010 and 2.9 in 2011 (Krudy 2012). Consequently, the prime brokerage 
industry today remains highly concentrated among a few top players. (See Figure 1.) 
The declining trading volumes that have helped the leading prime brokers avoid the loss of 
more market share have also put pressure on the profitability of the industry. Robert Lyons, 
the former Chief Operating Officer at Bear Stearns Global Equities, estimates that total annual 
revenue for prime brokers has fallen from $15 billion in 2008 to $12 billion in 2011 (Krudy 
2012). It is against this backdrop of declining revenues that the Basel III framework has 
added to the difficulties faced by prime brokers, as enhanced capital requirements and new 
liquidity standards applicable to prime brokers’ traditional securities financing business has 
resulted in higher costs.  
Figure 1: 2013 Prime Broker Market Shares 
Prime Broker Clients Clients as % of all Registered Funds 
Goldman Sachs 1,777 20.7 
Morgan Stanley 1,346 15.7 
J.P. Morgan 1,339 15.6 
Credit Suisse 882 10.3 
Deutsche Bank 689 8.0 
UBS 622 7.3 
Citigroup 458 5.3 
Bank of America 354 4.1 
Barclays 315 3.7 
Fidelity Investments 269 3.1 
Source: Hedge Fund Alert (from SEC filings). 
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3. Traditional Securities Financing 
Hedge funds have long sought to enhance their returns by using leverage to gain more 
market exposure than they would get investing only their own capital. While aggregate 
hedge fund leverage has declined by approximately 30% since the onset of the financial crisis 
from about 3.5x total net asset value in 2007 to 2.4x as of 2011, even this lower ratio 
indicates that for every dollar in client assets, hedge funds are borrowing $1.40 more. In 
certain sectors of the hedge fund industry leverage is substantially higher, with aggregate 
leverage among hedge funds pursuing a fixed income arbitrage strategy topping out at 
around 13x total net asset value. 
Figure 2: Trends in Hedge Fund Leverage 
 
Source: Barclays 2012. 
Traditionally, hedge funds have achieved this leverage by borrowing funds from their prime 
brokers using one of two methods. The predominant method is “securities lending,” which 
is economically similar to “repo financing”: hedge funds sell securities to their prime brokers 
while simultaneously agreeing to repurchase the securities at a future date at a slightly 
higher price. (For a complete discussion of how repo financing works, see the YPFS Case 
Study Wiggins, et al. 2014C.) 
A second option available to hedge funds is margin lending, in which prime brokers provide 
direct loans to hedge funds secured by the hedge funds’ broader portfolios. (For a complete 
discussion of repo financing and margin lending as traditional sources of hedge fund 
leverage, see Barclays 2012.) 
Under each method, prime brokers extend their hedge fund clients loans which are recorded 
on the prime brokers’ balance sheets and are subject to the regulatory framework in which 
the prime brokers operate. Basel III imposes enhanced capital requirements and new 
liquidity standards applicable to such loans, significantly increasing the cost to banks of 
being engaged in this line of business. (For a complete discussion of Basel III’s enhanced 
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capital requirements and new liquidity standards, see the YPFS Case Study McNamara, et al. 
2014B.) 
4. Synthetic Financing 
With the Basel III framework imposing enhanced capital requirements and new liquidity 
standards that have driven up the cost to banks of traditional securities financing, prime 
brokers are increasingly shifting to the use of an alternative method to provide their hedge 
funds clients with the leverage they seek. This method, known as synthetic financing, relies 
on derivatives such as total return swaps (TRS) to provide leveraged exposure to an 
underlying asset without actually having to buy such asset. (See Figure 3 for example of how 
a TRS operates.) 
Figure 3: TRS Definition and Example 
 
Source: Project Editor Notes. 
To illustrate how synthetic financing operates, consider a scenario in which a hedge fund 
with $10 in cash wishes to gain exposure to $100 worth of General Electric stock. Using 
traditional securities financing, the hedge fund would borrow $90 from its prime broker and 
purchase $100 worth of General Electric stock. The hedge fund would ultimately be 
responsible for paying back the $90 to the prime broker plus interest. The prime broker 
would have no exposure to General Electric stock (except to the extent that the performance 
of the hedge fund’s investment in General Electric stock affected its ability to repay the loan).  
Alternatively, the parties could engage in a synthetic financing transaction in which the 
hedge fund enters into a TRS with the prime broker pursuant to which the hedge fund posts 
$10 in collateral and the prime broker agrees to pay the hedge fund the amount of any 
increase in the price of $100 worth of General Electric stock. In return, the hedge fund agrees 
to pay the prime broker an agreed upon rate of interest over the life of the swap, as well as 
the amount of any decrease in the price of $100 worth of General Electric stock. 
Having entered into such a TRS, the prime broker would immediately purchase $100 worth 
of General Electric stock to hedge its exposure. This having been done, the economics of the 
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leveraged exposure look identical under traditional securities financing and synthetic 
financing. (See Figure 4). 
Although the economics of the leveraged exposure look identical, the synthetic financing 
transaction receives different treatment under the Basel III framework. Whereas traditional 
securities financing results in the creation of an asset on the bank’s balance sheet (in the 
form of the loan to the hedge fund), in the case of a synthetic financing transaction, the asset 
is the securities position entered into as a hedge to the swap exposure, (the exposure which 
is an off-balance-sheet item). Pursuant to Basel III’s rules, the indebtedness associated with 
traditional securities financing transactions can be netted only if there is a single 
counterparty and not across multiple client accounts. Conversely, long and short securities 
positions entered into to hedge synthetic financing transactions with different clients can be 
netted. As Figure 5 illustrates, where long and short positions can be paired across multiple 
client accounts, synthetic financing results in lower balance sheet usage than traditional 
securities financing.  
Figure 4: Traditional Financing vs. Synthetic Financing 
 
Source: Project Editor Notes. 
  
96
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 1 Iss. 4
   
 
 
Figure 5: Balance Sheet Treatment of Traditional Financing vs. Synthetic Financing 
 
Source: Project Editor Notes. 
 
Figure 6: Calculating Exposure 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements 2014, 4. 
 
This ability to net the long and short hedging positions associated with TRS transactions 
leaves the treatment of the off-balance sheet exposure stemming from such transactions as 
the remaining consideration, and the fact that Basel III does not treat these exposures the 
same as the assets arising from traditional securities financing has fueled a shift towards 
synthetic financing. The difference in treatment is perhaps most apparent in the functioning 
of the Basel III leverage ratio. Intended as a non-risk-based backstop to Basel III’s risk-based 
capital requirements, the leverage ratio requires banks to maintain Tier 1 capital equal to at 
least 3% of their “total exposure.” Total exposure consists of “(a) on-balance sheet 
exposures; (b) derivative exposures; (c) securities financing transaction (SFT) exposures; 
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and (d) off-balance sheet (OBS) items” (Bank for International Settlements 2014, 2). While 
Basel III requires the inclusion of all balance sheet assets (including gross SFT assets with 
limited netting for transactions with the same counterparty), its treatment of derivative 
exposures is different. Rather than include the full notional amount of derivative exposure 
in the leverage ratio exposure measure, Basel III calculates the amount to include as the sum 
of the replacement cost (RC) of the current exposure (i.e., its mark-to-market value) and an 
add-on for potential future exposure (PFE) arrived at by multiplying an assumed add-on 
factor to the notional amount of the derivative. 
With add-on factors ranging from 0.0% to 15.0% based on duration and the nature of the 
underlying asset, as indicated in Figure 7, only a small percentage of a derivatives’ notional 
value could end up being included in the leverage ratio exposure measure (although given 
the large notional values often associated with derivatives positions even this could be 
substantial).  
This treatment of derivatives would mean that a bank entering a five-year $100 million at-
the-money TRS with respect to a company’s stock would have $8 million in exposure for 
leverage ratio purposes based on $0 in replacement cost and $8 million in potential future 
exposure ($100 million notional amount multiplied by 8.0% five-year equity add on) (Levine 
2013a). If the hedging stock transaction is able to be netted with an offsetting position, this 
$8 million exposure would be the only figure included in the leverage ratio calculation. This 
is far less than the exposure that would result from a traditional securities financing loan to 
provide a hedge fund with similarly leveraged exposure to $100 million in stock, which 
would require that the full amount of the loan be included as an exposure for leverage ratio 
purposes. For example, if the bank loans the hedge fund $90 million dollars to buy $100 
million of stock, the full $90 million would be included in the leverage ratio. 
With leveraged exposure provided via derivatives requiring banks to maintain less capital 
than is required for traditional securities financing, a shift is underway in the prime 
brokerage industry towards greater use of synthetic financing. According to Risk magazine, 
J.P. Morgan’s international prime brokerage arm saw its synthetic balances more than 
double in 2012 (Devasabai 2013). Similarly, Barclays has reported double digit growth in its 
synthetic financing business and describes further growing the business as a “top priority.” 
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Figure 7: Add-on Factors for Determining Potential Future Exposure 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements 2014, 15. 
5. Implications 
While the leveraged exposure provided via traditional securities financing and via synthetic 
financing look identical in economic terms, it is possible that a difference in treatment under 
Basel III is somewhat justified. Traditional securities lending involves the creation of an 
immediate unilateral credit risk for the bank in the amount of the loan provided. Conversely, 
the credit risk in the case of a TRS is bilateral and contingent. Depending on the performance 
of the underlying asset, the bank may end up owing money to its counterparty rather than 
the other way around.  
What’s clear, however, is that a difference in treatment does exist, and that this difference is 
driving a shift in practices in the prime brokerage industry. While the thrust of most post-
crisis regulation has been to push activity away from opaque over-the-counter derivatives, 
here the effect seems to be the opposite. Additionally, because the efficiencies of synthetic 
financing depend on matching customer longs with customer shorts, prime brokers have an 
incentive to build up greater exposure to more customers, potentially creating increased 
interconnectedness risk stemming from the growing amount of exposure that many different 
customers will have to a single prime broker. (For a discussion of the potential implications 
of a shift toward synthetic financing, see Levine 2013b.) 
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